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THE LAW OF REAL COVENANTS: .EXCEPTIONS TO
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE SUBJECT BY
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
HENRY UPSON SIMS

It is unfortunate that the restatement of the law of covenants which run
with land, the fifth and last chapter of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Property, should have reflected the particular
views of the Reporter and a majority of his 'Advisers.' And it is more unfortunate that coming before the body of the Institute, as the subject did,
on the last day, and almost at the last hour, of the annual meeting, when
it could not be adequately debated for lack of time, the vote of the house,
though only seventeen sustaining the Reporter's position to seventeen against
him, left the Reporter's views upon the historical approach and the legitimate
development of the law of covenants at least legislatively sustained.
The vote was taken upon a motion to expunge from the introductory note
to sections which are declared to restate the law with reference to the running of the burden of covenants, some ten pages which attempt to set out
the origin and development of that law down to very modern times, and
which lay the basis for declaratory sections greatly hampering and, it would
appear, directed to checking the future running of the burden of covenants.
It is not the purpose of this article merely to debate the .historical question presented to the meeting of the Institute by that motion to expunge. But
it is necessary to review the history of real covenants as revealed by the
books down to the separation of the flow of the law in England as compared
to that in America, before attempting to prove what the law in America
generally is, and what beneficent law can be developed therefrom -if unhampered by the declaratory sections of the Restatement of the Institute.
It is the plan of this article, first, to give a resume of the origin and history
of the law of real covenants, both as to the running of benefits and as to the
running of burdens, down to the rejection by the English Courts of the
running of burdens at law by the decision in Webb v. Russell,2 and by that
'The Reporter was Professor Oliver S. Rundell of the Law School of the University
of Wisconsin.
23 T. R. 393, 100 Eng. Repr. 639 (1789).
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in Keppell v. Bailey,3 followed by the English invention of equitable restrictive covenants by Lord Cottenham in Tulk v. Moxhay.4 Secondly, it is proposed to show that the law in America has not followed.fhe English rejection
of the running of burdens at law; but that in America, in a large majority
of the states where the question has been litigated, no substantial difference
is made between the running of burdens and the running of benefits, so that
with the exception of only two States, New Jersey and Virginia, the notion
that the burdens of none but restrictive covenants can run, and that only in
equity, has not been accepted. And thirdly, if it is found that the law of a
majority of the states recognizes the running of covenants with land, both
as to burdens and benefits, it is proposed to determine, in comparison with
the Law Institute's Restatement of the law of real covenants, what requirements they must meet in order to be enforceable by and against assignees
of the land with which they run.
This attempted demonstration will be followed by a discussion of a few
cases in which usefulness of covenants rather than other devices for interparty protection would seem apparent; cases which show that recognition
of the running of covenants should be extended rather than checked, and that
the English law enforcing only restrictive covenants is insufficient to meet
the needs of society.
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF REAL COVENANTS:
ENGLISH CASES
The author of this article wrote an essay in 1900 devoted exclusively to
the running of real covenants,5 and Professor Charles E. Clark, formerly of
the Yale Law School, now Judge Clark of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote another in 1928 ;6 since which time no
one has written fully on the subject, although such covenants have been partially covered by Mr. Herbert W. Tiffany in his work on Real Property, and
several learned writers have elaborated part of the law in various law reviews, notably Professor Harry A. Bigelow, 7 Professor Ralph W. Aigler,8
Professor Austin W. Scott, 9 Professor Percy Bordwell,' 0 Professor George
32 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042 (1834).
42 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Repr. 1143 (1848).
5SIMS, COVENANTS WHICH RuN WITH LAND, OTHER THAN COVENANTS FOR TImE

(1901).
6

CLARK,
7(1914)
8(1911)
9(1917)
10(1923)

REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHicH RuN WITH LAND (1929).
12 MIcH. L. REV. 651.
10 MIcH. L. REV. 187.
17 CoL. L. REv. 285.
33 YALE L. J. 292.
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L. Clark," and Dean Harlan F. Stone, now Chief Justice Stone of the
Supreme Court of the United States.' 2 Nothing else comprehensive, however, seems to have been written on the subject until the chapter on Covenants in Volume V of the Restatement of Property by the American Law
Institute, completed and soon to be published.' 3
The writer and Judge Clark are not entirely in accord as to the origin
of the running of covenants to successors to the title to lands affecting which
the covenants were made. The writer believes that covenants ran by analogy
to the running of express warranties, and that the running of express warranties was accepted because the implied warranties ran before implied warranties were rendered ineffective by the passage of the Statute of Quia
Emptores, 18 Edward 1.14 Judge Clark, however, while not denying the
possibility of this origin, considers such an explanation unproven, although
he seems to be in full accord with the writer on the running of both burdens
and benefits; and he recognizes that the running of covenants has nothing
to do with the assignability vel non of choses -in action in early law, the
path by which the Institute's Restatement approaches the subject. 15 Judge
Clark and the writer have the support of eminent scholars for their view.
Professor Holdsworth, writing on "Choses in Abtion in the Common Law"
said, "Rights of action of a contractual kind must always be of a purely
personal nature. .

.

. Therefore in early law the prohibition against thdir

assignment was absolute. It is true that in most cases they became transmissible on death at a comparatively early date. It is true also that it was
recognized that certain covenants might be so annexed to a particular estate
in the land that successive holders of that estate could enforce them [referring to Volume Three of his "History of English Law," pp. 130-135]. But
11(1917) 16 MicH. L PEv. 93.
12(1918) 18 CoL L Rv. 292.

' 3 The writer has not access to. MR. B.HAN's discussion of

COVENANTS

AFFECTING

LAND.
4

1 SIMs, op. cit. supra note 5 at c. 3.

15CLAzx, op. cit. supra note 6 at 99, as to the origin; and that covenants ran, both
as to benefits and burdens, see CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6 at 73, and his recent article
in (1943) 52 YALE L J. 699.
In a recent letter to the writer of this article, Judge Clark expresses his view "that
a more direct source of our modem law of covenants is the ancient proceeding to
enforce a fine, which was usually by a writ de fino facto and which was essentially a
real covenant in the modem sense." He has found a considerable number of cases
from the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries where this writ was used at that early
day to enforce a fine covering obligations other than warranty and of a character
substantially similar to the burdens of modern real covenants; -nd he thinks this use
a more likely origin for the use of covenants to enforce other obligations than the
use of the writ of covenant to enforce a written warranty.
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to the end the common law never in theory departed from its rule that
rights of a contractual kind could not be assigned by an act of the parties
to a contract."'16
Professor James Barr Ames was more explanatory. Lecturing on "Covenant," he said:
When the Germans became familiar with Roman civilization it was
natural to put the terms of the agreement into a written document, which
was passed to the creditor along with the wvdiz; and in time the wadia
itself was omitted. This document, adding the requirement of a seal
to make it formal, is the English covenant.
The earliest covenants we find in the books seem to touch the land.
The earliest instance of a covenant not relating to land is of the time of
Edward III. The earliest covenants were regarded as grants, and suit
could not be brought on the covenant itself. So a covenant to stand
seised was a grant, and executed itself. The same is true of a covenant
for the payment of money; it was a grant of the money, and executed itself. For failure to pay the money, debt would lie. Afterwards
an
17
action of covenant was allowed, so that today there is an option.
Professor Ames also noted that the right to enforce a covenant of warranty
went only to those who were expressly named.
As soon as covenants of warranty were introduced there was no difficulty if A made his covenant broad enough to cover the heirs and assigns
of B; i.e., if A made a covenant of warranty to B, his heirs
and assigns,
8
and B conveyed to C, C as assignee of B could sue A.'
He noted finally, that the obligation ran with the transfer of land.
It is absolutely essential to bring one within the words of a promise,.
but not to show that he is the grantee of the land. It is enough to show
that he has whatever interest was conveyed. Thus if A makes a deed of
land which he does not own to B, and B to C, C gets no title, but he
can enforce the warranty against A. The law that a covenant could
be sued on by an assignee was very ancient.
I believe also that covenants ran with the reversion at common .law,
*though here the authority is not so dear. These instances which I have
given relate to realty. I have been able to find no instance of a covenant to pay money being made to A and assigns.' 9
It is evident that covenants which run with land are just as much a concept or phase of the common law as is seisin. Whatever was the germ
16(1920) 33 H~Av. L REv. 1018.
17A.mEs, Lcrunas ox LaA. HiSToRY

181d. at 100.
19d. at 102.

(1913) 18.
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5

from which they took their origin, they are sui generis, and in their development, as they have survived in modem law, they must not be assimilated
to other concepts of the common law which have developed along other
lines. Certainly they must not be treated as mere contracts, limited by
notions of third party benefits, doctrines of consideration, or even the theories of trusts, including conscience-binding and notice. As said by Crawford
Dawes Hening in speaking of another third party right, namely, the right
to an accounting, "We err in attempting to analyze into constituent elements
a substantive right which is itself primary and elemental."' 2
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his collected lectures on the common law, published over sixty years ago, said that a covenant or contract under seal
"was a promise of a distinct nature, for which a distinct form of action
came to be provided."' 21 He traced the liability of an heir to make good
his ancestor's covenant of warranty first to identity of ancestor and heir,
as was also the right bf the heir of the convenantee to claim the benefit
of the covenant; and the right and liability respectively of the assignees of
the first parties, he shows, was traceable to the quasi heirship of one's
assigns.22 But always, as was said-by Professor Ames, the heirs and assigns
must have been mentioned in the covenant to obtain, or to be subject to
relief.23 "The assign, as in [common law] warranty, came in under the
24
old covenant with the first covenantee, not by any new right of his own."
Thus only successors to the estate of the original parties to the covenant,
and only those successors named therein under the term heirs and assigns
could sue or be sued to make good the warranty. 25
At this point, however, Mr. Justice Holmes divides real covenants into
two classes. Covenants of title he considers the true children of the covenants of warranty, which continue to privies in title alone, that is, they never
run to disseisors nor to parties who do not base their rights on lawful
succession. Active covenants, however, that is, covenants to do something
affecting land, and restrictive or passive covenants, that is, covenants to
refrain from doing something on the affected land, he believed traceable
to certain spurious easements, or to incorporeal rights which might have
been recognized as pure easements if they had been granted by the cove20

History of the Beneficiar's Action in Assumpsit, 3 SmLEr EssAys ix ANGLO-

AMERICAN
LEGAL HIsToRY (1909)
21

339.
HoLmES, THE COMmON LAW (1881)

22id. at 373.
2
3Id. at 374.
24Id. at 379.

25Ibid.

272.
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nantor as such. Mr. Justice Holmes worked out this theory with his usual
scholarship and perspicacity in his lectures on the common law, 2 6 and later
in his opinion in the case of Norcross v. James.27 But, after all, it is a matter
of the authority, and the old cases and accepted authorities do not really
compel Mr. Justice Holmes' view.
He begins with the law of easements, both granted and acquired by prescription. From the early law they are attached to the land, and the dominant land holds the easement against the servient land.28 After the easement
has been granted or perfected, even a disseisor of the dominant tenement may
exercise the easement.29 But easements, being obligations of land rather
than of persons, were of course passive obligations like the easement of a
right of way over a servient tenement. All easements, involving obligations
of land, are essentially passive only. 30 because land cannot be active like a
person. But four early cases furnished Justice Holmes with a basis for
concluding that land may be burdened with active obligations. In the first,
Pakenham's Case,-3 an action of covenant was brought by Pakenham as
heir of his great-grandfather against a prior whose predecessor in charge of
a convent had covenanted with the plaintiff's said ancestor to provide weekly
singing in a chapel on what was. at the time, the plaintiff's manor. It cannot be said exactly what the judgment was. but privity of estate between
the plaintiff and the covenantee, and the right of prescription were both
argued by the counsel and by the judges.
The second case was Horne's Casee.3 2 where the plaintiff alleged a covenant between his ancestor and the defendant's predecessor to sing in a
certain chapel, and the action was allowed, although it does not clearly appear
how the plaintiff recovered, as he probably did not own the chapel.
Next came the Prior of Woburn's Case,3' where an action was allowed
against the prior for ceasing to sing according to a custom in the plaintiff's
chapel. And lastly came Yielding v. Fay,3 4 which was a suit on an alleged
obligation based on custom to furnish a bull and a boar for the use of the
parish. Mr. Justice Holmes also relied upon the anciently recognized spuri261d. at 381-409.
27140
Mass. 188 (1885).
28
HOLMES, TnE COMMON LAW (1881) 385, et seq.
291d. at 386.
30
GALE, ON EASEMENTS (8th ed. by Reeve, 1908) 8.
31y. B., 42 Edward III, 3, placitun 14.
32y. B., 2 Henry IV, 6.
33y. B., 22 Henry VI, 46, pl. 36. Y. B., 21 Edward I, 182, an earlier case may have
been
34 a decision.
Cro. Eliz. 569, 78 Eng. Repr. 813.
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ous easement of fencing,3 5 which had already been recognized and enforced
in the form of a covenant running with the land by the Massachusetts Court
in Bronson v. Coffin.36 In the various Registers of Writs, some of them
dating from Glanvil's day, were certain writs directed to the enforcement
of this and other spurious easements. Mr. F. W. Maitland noted, in a
register which he attributed to the time of Richard II, the writ de curia
7
And in Lavre.nce v. Jenkins,3 8
claudenda (to enforce the duty to fence).
Archibald, J., speaking for the Court in rendering judgment for the plaintiff
for damages resulting from a failure of the defendant to keep up a fence,
said, "A party entitled by prescription to the benefits of the fence might
formerly, by means of a writ de curia claudenda (Fitz. Nat. Brev. 127), have
compelled the adjoining owner to repair it, and have recovered damages for
the non-repair."
There was also an ancient writ de reparatione facienda by which a joint
tenant, or a person owning a building, might compel the owner of an adjoining building to repair. 30 By a similar writ the owner of a subjacent portion
of the building might compel the owner of the upper part to repair the
roof, and the owner of the- upper part could compel the owner of the lower
part to repair the foundations of the structure.
But these writs may not have been much used to enforce active duties
directly. Mr. Maitland says that the register of writs, "naturally includes all
the common forms that are in daily use; but it includes, also, many forms
of a highly specialized kind,--forms which set forth the facts of particular
cases which have happened once, but are by no means likely to happen
again." 4° It is by no means certain that these spurious easements, though
binding upon land by prescription if they appeared in the form of covenants
in a deed, were for that reason enforceable as such by any one in possession
of the land to which the spurious obligation from the servient land was owed.
As in Horne's Case,4 the action might well have been a case of cessavit,
where "the demandant, in an action of this nature, hoped, by establishing his
claims, to recover seisin of the lands in respect of which the services were
due. '42 And Mr. Charles James Gale said,
35

HOLMES, THE COMmOx LAW (1881)

393, 402, Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188,

2 N. E. 946 (1885).
30108 Mass. 175 (1871), Gray, J., writing the opinion for the court.
37The History of the Register of Original Writs, 3 HARV. L. REv. (1890) 97, 167, 212,
LEGAL HISTORY (1908) 549, 592.
3

reprinted in 2"SEI.Ecr ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN

8L. R. 8 Q. B. 274 (1873).

392 BouviER LAW DiCm. 447; FITZHERVERT, NATURA BREvium, No.
40
4 1MAITLAND, 2 SElzcr ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMEmCAN LEGAL HISTORY
42

See note 33 supra.

295.

(1908) 549, 557.

Pike, An Action at Law in the Reign of Edwcard 11, 2 SELlEr ESSAYS IN THE
(1908) 597; (1893) 7 HARV. L REV. 266.

HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
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There may be a spurious kind of easement obliging an owner of land
to keep his fences in a state of repair, not only sufficiently to restrain
his own cattle within bounds, but also those of his neighbours; and
rendering them liable for any injury which his neighbour's cattle may
unsustain in consequence of the non-repair of the fences,-which,
43
less an easement had been acquired, he clearly would not be.
Whether Mr. Justice Holmes' theory is sound or not-that the burden
of such covenants when they affect certain lands for the benefit of other
lands should still be enforceable by the benefited owner against any occupant
of the burdened land-he dearly believed that the burdens of covenants
as well as the benefits, could run with land to assigns and heirs alike,
whether at law or equity, and that is sufficient for the discussion at hand.
One old case, the report of which is not confused like the two cases above
referred to (Pakenhan's Case and Home's Case, which were evidently
efforts to enforce a custom to furnish singing), is reported in Y. B. 4 Edw.
III, 57, coming up again in Y. B. 7 Edw. III, 65. Though nearly forty
years earlier than Pakenharn's Case, and earlier still than Horne's Case, it
definitely holds that heirs and successors to lands were bound by their
ancestor's covenants and that they could enforce the benefits conferred on
imposed on them if they Were holders respectively
them and the burdens
44
lands.
affected
of the
43

44

GALE, ON EASEMENTS (8th ed. by Reeve, 1908) 465.

SIMs, op. cit. supra note 5 at 55, 56, where the case is abstracted as follows:
N..Abbot de H. brings covenant against Robert de C. upon a covenant between
N.

the Abbot's predecessor and one Roger, the defendant's ancestor. Roger had granted
a mill to the Abbot and his successors, and covenanted that neither Roger nor his heirs
would build another mill on the same tenement without the Abbot's consent. After
considerable argument it appeared that a mill had been built in the ancestor's time
and the heirs had merely refused to tear it down. It was questioned whether an action
could be brought- by the successor against the heir and whether there could be judgment
that the mill be torn down. Finally the court ordered the defendant to answer over,
the defendant, however, calling for judgment on the count because it was sought to
hold him to the ancestor's covenant without proving assets by descent.
"So in 7 EIII, 65, the case came up again, the Abbot asking judgment for time past
and a destruction of the mill for the future. The defendant's counsel said 'You do not
assign any tort ...
in our time; for you assign that the mill was built in time of your
predecessors and our ancestors.' The Court replied, 'If it be law that the covenant is
binding between the parties and the heirs of one party and the successors of the other
party so that the covenant is perpetual, the covenant will first also hold against the
heir of the party as against the party himself. So if he shall be able entirely to perform
the covenant in its nature, he shall do it; and if not he shall do what he can. And if
he be tenant of the mill he shall destroy the mill for the future,' etc.
"But that did not seem to satisfy all, for Shard replied, 'Sir, the record appears
that Robert thus continued the tort which his ancestor did,' but he added, 'Still he is
tenant of the mill, and so he can destroy the mill.' But the defendant said, 'The covenant is not made to destroy the mill, and more it is framed upon negative words which
do not bind in law.'. . . citing the promise not to sow land as unenforceable. To which
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Only one other reported case on the running of real covenants seems to
have arisen between the above-referred to Year Book Cases and the enactment of the Statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34. Brooke's Abridgment (Covenant
No. 32), abstracts a case decided in 25 Hen. VIII in which a lease for
years imposed a covenant on the lessee to repair, and the assignee of the
lessee was held liable to the lessor on the covenant; Brooke adding that the
assignee might also sue the lessor on covenants by the lessor, if there were
any. At that time prior to the Statute, of course there was no essential
difference between a covenant in a lease and one in the grant of a fee,
except the later-called privity between the parties involved in leases. But
that concept of privity- was not emphasized until the Court of King's Bench
did so in Spencers Case,45 and Lord Kenyon in Webb v. Russell.46 So the
case is an authority that the burden of a covenant will rim to an assignee.
The Statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, was enacted, as recited in its preamble, because many lands which had been forfeited to the crown under the
Statute of Mortmain of 27 Hen. VIII, and which had been granted or
patented by the crown to strangers to the original holders, had been subject
to leases containing covenants or conditions which could not be enforced
against the lessees by the new holders. Therefore Parliament enacted that
all grantees of the King, their heirs, successors or assigns, should have the
same advantages against the lessees,47 their executors, administrators oi
assigns for not performing "conditions, covenants, or agreements contained
and expressed in the indentures of their leases . . . as the said lessors or

grantors themselves, or their heirs or successors, ought, should, or might
have had and enjoyed at any time or times, in like manner and form as
if the reversion of such lands . . . had not come into the hands" of the
crown. The Statute included, however, not merely grantees of the King,
but "also all other persons being grantees or assignees . . . to or by any

other person or persons than the King's highness, and the heirs, executors,
successors and assigns of every of them."
What this last clause means we do not know, nor do we know why it
was inserted, unless to cover assignments of reversions made under duress
to others than the crown. The Statute has never been carefully construed by
the cburts. But it has been made the basis of the assumption that voluntary
the Court said that would be so were there no covenant, but a covenant made it
otherwise."
455 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Repr. 72 (1583). Coke was merely the reporter. There is no
telling what the various judges really said.
463 T. R. 393, 100 Eng. Repr. 639 (1789).
47
Italics added.
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assignees of reversions before the Statute did not have the right to enforce
covenants in leases, 48 although, as we have seen, there is nothing in the

early law to justify such a position.
The Statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, continued with a section providing
that all lessees, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, shall have
like action, advantage, and remedy against persons holding grants from
the King, "or of any other person or persons," of the reversion of lands
leased "for any'condition covenant or agreement" contained in their leases
which they might and should have had against the lessors, "their heirs and
successors,"49 except the benefits of warranties.
Lord St. Leonards thought that the second section was added to the
statute merely to avoid appearing to give everything to the lords and nothing
to the tenants. 5° And of course as far as voluntary assignments were concerned, there was privity between the lessee and the assignee of the reversion any way, so that the Statute was merely declaratory. But the language
evidently gave rise to some doubt, first in the minds of the editors of the
fifth edition of Williams' notes, 5' and recently in the mind of the Reporter
of the subject for the Institute's Restatement, whether the burden of cove52
nants, even in leases ran with the reversion at Common Law.
But Section II of the Statute gave to lessees, holding thereafter under the
King's grantees of reversions, the rights which the lessees had by common
law against their original lessors, "their heirs and successors," but omitted
to refer to the lessee's right at common law against the lessor's assigns.
The whole question therefore comes down to whether there was any difference at common law between the lessee's right to sue the heir or successor
48
See Sergeant Williams' note 3 to Thursby v. Plant, 1 Wins. Saunders 239, 240, 85
Eng. Repr. 268, 270, and note of John Win. Smith, the editor of Smith's Leading Cases
to Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16, 77 Eng. Repr. 19 (1583). In Smith's Leading Cases 22,
Smith gives no authority but Sergeant Williams, and Sergeant Williams gives only
later
49 cases.
Italics added.
50
SuGDEN, VENDORS & PURCHiASERS (14th ed. 1873) 582.
1
r The editors of the 5th edition of Sergeant Williams' collection of notes and reprint
of Saunders' Reports were John Patterson, later of the Queens Bench, and Edward
Vaughan Williams, who, writing in 1824, said that Walker's Case, 3 Co. 24, 76 Eng.
Repr. 676 (involving the question whether the Statute transferred the privity of estate or
the privity of contract between the lessee and the lessor) might best be reconciled "by
considering that at common law covenants ran with the land, but not with the reversion;
therefore the assignee of the lessee was held to be liable in covenant, and to be entitled to bring covenant, but the assignee of the lessor was not." He then goes into
the question whether the action is local or transitory.
This view of covenants was adopted by John William Smith in his note to Spencer's
in Smith's Leading Cases.
Case
52
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (Proposed Final Draft #2, 1944) 45, 46, Introductory
Note.
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of a lessor on the lessor's covenant, and his right to sue the lessor's assign.
We have seen that if the assign was mentioned in the covenant there was
no difference. Therefore the clear purpose of Section II of the Statute of
32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, was to give lessees or their assigns the right to sue
grantees of lessors or their assigns on covenants in leases, whether the
language of the covenant in the lease specified assigns or not.
Errors and hasty impressions of judges and writers on law, when they
have earned the reputation of being erudite, often become engiafted in the
law and produce irremediable confusion. Thus, the law of real covenants in
England, first twisted by Sergeant Williams and John William Smith, has
continued confused and historically inaccurate to the present time.
The course of the English law on the running of the benefits and burdens
of covenants with fee estates, from the Statute of 32 Hen. VIII to the
present time, can be learned by following comparatively few cases. The
running of the benefit of covenants was generally accepted, and it was not
always thought necessary that the covenant originate in the grant of a fee
estate. In Sharp v. Waterhouse,53 it was assumed that the devisee of land,
benefited by a covenant in a deed which granted only an easement, might
sue at law for the benefits of the covenant. But the notion, that the grant
of an easement was enough to enable the benefit of a covenant to run, was
checked in 1881, when the Queen's Bench Division 54 refused to allow a suit
by the assignee -of a rent to collect damages for breach of a covenant to
repair by the grantee of the land, holding that Lord Ellenborough in Milmes
v. Branch55 had settled the law, that the benefit of a covenant to build and
keep in repair would not run with the grant of a rent. There seems to be
no case to change this holding, therefore, it is probably the present English
law that neither the benefit nor the burden of a covenant will run with
5G
merely an incorporeal hereditament.
But while it has been often conceded by English courts, that the benefit of
a covenant touching and concerning granted land will run with a granted
fee estate to assignees of the covenantee, so that they can sue the covenantor
personally in a law court on his covenant for breaches occurring during the
plaintiff's ownership of the land, 57 there appears to be no actual English
decision to that effect.
E. & B. 816, 119 Eng. Repr. 1449 (1857).
5 Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Society, 8 Q. B. D. 403 (1881).
555 M. & S. 411, 105 Eng. Repr. 1101 (1816).
5
6See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1473-4.
5T
Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393, 100 Eng. Repr. 639 (1789). Rogers v. Hosegood,
[1,00] 2 Ch. 388. John William Smith's note to Spencer's Case, 1 Smith's Leading
Cases (5th Amer. ed., Hare & Wallace) 123.
537
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It has also been said, ever since Lord Kenyon's remarks about the Statute
of 32 Hen. VIII in Webb v. Rwssell,58 fortified by the above quoted authority
of Sergeant Williams' note to Thursby v. Pl4ot," and the note of John
William Smith to Spencer's Case, that while the benefit may run, the burden
of a covenant will not run with the land granted, and that neither the covenantee nor his assignee can sue the assignee of the covenantor for damages
for breaches occurring during such assignee's ownership of the land. 60 Let
us examine the authority for that. Here the holdings become illogical, in
addition to being based on a mistaken notion of legal history.
Lord Brougham, in deciding Keppell v. Bailey,61 dissolved an ex parte
injunction restraining the defendant from using any other railroad than the
one which their vendor had covenanted to use in shipping the product of a
certain mine acquired by the defendant, and held that the burden of the
covenant did not run with the mine. His main reason for so holding was
that there was no community of title between the original covenantor and
the covenantees, since the covenant was merely a group arrangement between the incorporators (owners) of the benefited railroad and the owner
of the mine who had been one of the incorporators. In short, there was no
"privity of estate" between the parties. Lord Brougham 62 recognized a
community of interest in the land existing between a life tenant and a reversioner, and between a lessor and a lessee, and between the owner of an
incorporeal hereditament and the owner of the other interests in the property. But he saw little community of interest between the grantor and the
grantee of a fee, and said that "it must not be supposed that incidents of
novel kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice
of the owner.... Great detriment would arise and much confusion of rights
if the parties were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying
real property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar
character, which would follow them into all hands, however remote." He
then reviewed the cases and held that the burden of the covenant did not
run with the land to subject assignees to an injunction not to disregard it.
He also said that the fact that the assignee had notice of the covenant
afforded no reason to burden him with it, if it was not a charge upon the
583 T. R. 393, 100 Eng. Repr. 639 (1789). Brewster v. Kidgill, 12 Mod. 166, 88 Eng.
Repr. 1239. Brewster v. Kitchin, 1 Id. Rayn. 317, 91 Eng. Repr. 1108, is too uncertainly reported to be taken as an authority on the point.
591 Wins. Saunders, 237, 241, 85 Eng. Repr. 268, 271-275.
60
Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042 (1834); Rogers v. Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch. 388.
612 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042 (1834).
622 Myl. & K. 534-5, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042, 1048 (1834).
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land at law, thus forestalling the doctrine to the contrary soon to be declared in Tulk v. Moxlhay.
Keppell v. Bailey woild thus exclude both the benefits and burdens of
practically all covenants from running with the affected lands to assigns,
which is logical enough. In the same volume of reports (2 Myl. & K.) is
the report of the case of The Duke of Bedford v. The Trustees of the British
Museum, 6 4 decided twelve years earlier and referred to in Keppell v. Bailey,
in which Lord Eldon had refused to enforce a restrictive covenant, because
it was not enforceable at law. The Duke of Bedford had probably placed
himself in the position of losing his right to sue at law, but Lord Eldon's
view was, "The question ... is not whether the party can bring an action
but whether he can come into equity for relief and thereby render an action
for compensation unnecessary."'6 5 The old notion was, it will be recalled,
that no injunction should be made permanent until the plaintiff had recov66
ered a judgment at law establishing his legal rights.
Omitting discussion, for the moment, of the equitable doctrine of Tulk v.
Moxhay, let us note that the Chancery Division in Cooke v. Chilcott67 held
that the assignee of a grantee of land to which the grantor had annexed in
his deed a covenant to supply water was entitled to an order against the
assignee of the covenantor placing him in contempt if he should not supply
the water, the Court, Vice Chancellor Malins, holding that the burden of
the covenant ran with the land.
Cooke v. Chilcott was later disapproved by the Court of Appeal in Haywood v. Brunswick Building Society,e6 although the question involved was
the running of the burden of a covenant with merely an incorporeal hereditament, but Lord Justice Lindley said, "I should be sorry to overrule that
case [Cooke v. Chilcott], and prefer to leave it to be reconsidered on some
future occasion."'
It did come up again in Rogers v. Hosegood,0 but involving restrictive
covenants only, where the divisional court through Farwell, J., said: "I see
no difficulty in holding that the benefit of a covenant runs with the land of
the covenantee, while the burden of the same covenant does not run with the
632 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Repr. 1143 (1848).
642 Myl. & K. 552, 39 Eng. Repr. 1055 (1822).
65d. at 564, 39 Eng. Repr. at 1060.
6This will appear from the language of Lord Eldon arguendo. Id. at 570, 39 Eng.
Repr. at 1062.
673 Ch. D. 694 (1877).
688 Q. B. D., 403 (1881).
69d.at 411.
70[1900] 2 CIL 388.
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land of the covenantor." 7' 1 And proceeding, he said. "It is true that in many of
the cases decided by the Court of Chancery expressions are found to the
effect that the defendants ate bound in equity, whether the covenant in
strictness run with the land or not. But I think such expressions are due
to the reluctance of the Vice Chancellors to express any opinion on points
of common law, and, for the reason I have already stated, I cannot see how
such a covenant can run in equity if it did not run at law."' 72 The Court
granted an injunction against threatened infringement, and the Court of
Appeal affirmed its decree on this point in an opinion which did not state
whether the burden of the covenant ran at law or whether it did not.
Prior to the case of Rogers v. Hosegood the Court of Appeal had a discussion on the question of the running of a covenant to bear the expense
of repairing a road,73 and while the Court (Cotton, Lindley, and Fry. L. JJ.)
denied the plaintiff relief on different grounds, Lord Justice Cotton declared
it his opinion that the benefit of a covenant might be annexed to land so as
to be enforced by assigns, but that the burden of a covenant could not be
so annexed.
Since Rogers v. Hosegood the only case involving the running of a covenant seems to be Forster v. Elvet Colliery Conzpan.y in the Queen's Bench
Division and the Court of Appeal,7 4 but that involved merely the running
of the benefit of a covenant in a lease. The case does not mention the
Statute of 32 Hen. VIII, but appears to have been decided on a later Statute
of 1881. It was held that the heirs of the owner of the surface could enforce
the covenant.
This leaves us only the much discussed case of Tulk v. Moxhay.7'5- The
plaintiff was the owner in fee of a vacant piece of ground in London, together with several residences adjoining it. He sold the piece of ground
to one Ems in fee, the deed to Ems containing a covenant by Ems, his
heirs and assigns. with the plaintiff, his heirs, executors and administrators
to keep and maintain the piece of ground as a pleasure ground. and that
the plaintiff's tenants might enjoy it at a reasonable rent. The piece of
ground came by mesne conveyances to the defendant (whose deeds did not
contain the covenant, but who had notice of the covenant), and the defendant
having asserted the right to build upon the lot, the plaintiff, who still owned
the houses, sought an injunction to restrain him from building.
71[1900] 2 Ch. p. 395.

721d. at 398.
73

Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (1884).
L. J. REP. N. s. 520, (1908).
752 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Repr. 1143 (1848).
7477
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The Court (Lord Cottenham) said that the case did not depend upon
whether the covenant ran with the land, but upon the defendant's having
notice of the covenant when he bought, "for if an equity is attached to the
property by the owner, no one purchasing with' notice of that equity can
stand in a different situation from the party from whom he purchased."
Lord Cottenham continued: "With respect to the observations of Lord
Brougham in Keppell v. Bailey, he never could have meant to lay down
that this Court would not enforce an equity attached to land by the owner,
unless under such circumstances as would support an action at law. If that
be the result of his observations, I can only say that I cannot coincide
with it."
Efforts were made in many later cases to extend the doctrine of Tulk v.
Moxlhay to other than restrictive covenants, but the English Courts have
76
always declined to do so.
The holding in Tulk v. Moxhay has been definitely followed, however,
in enough English decisions to make it the la4 of England beyond question
when a purely restrictive covenant is inserted in a deed conveying a fee
and the covenantor has assigned the land restricted by the covenant to
another who has notice of the covenant before or at the time of acquiring
the land the use of which is so restricted. 77 Sometimes the restriction has
been called an equitable charge upon the land, 78 although as shown by Lord
Brougham and Lord Eldon, 79 there should be alluwed no equitable charge
which would not have been a legal charge if properly created. Sometimes
the restriction has been called a trust," although there is no res of which
such a trust can consist. Sometimes the restriction has been called an
equitable easement,8 1 although it is not comparable with any easement
recognized by the common law of England or by the law of Rome. It cannot even be assimilated to the spurious easements recognized by Mr. Justice
Holmes, since they were created by active covenants, and the doctrine of
Tulk v. Moxhay has been applied to passive covenants only.
In some cases the restrictive covenant seems not even to conform to the
requirement of Spencer's Case, that for a covenant to run it must "touch
76London & S. W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (Jessell, M.R., 1881) ; Haywood
v. Brunswick Soc., 8 Q. B. D. 403, 408 (Brett, L.J., 1881) ; Austerberry v. Corp. of
Oldham, 29 Ch. D. 750 (Lindley and Fry, L.JJ., 1884).
77Coles v. Sims, Kay 56, 69 Eng. Repr. 25 (1853) ; Mann v. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377,
6078Eng. Repr. 665 (1846) ; Luke v. Dennis, 7 Ch. D. 227, 236 (1877).
Per Jessel, M.R. in L. & S. W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882).
79See quotations from them on pp. 12 and 13, supra.
80
lt has been called a trust by American courts only, never by English courts.
81
Per Jessel, M.R. in L & S. W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882).
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and concern" the land. Can it be said that a covenant not to sell alcoholic
drinks on the premises touches and concerns the land ?82
The only unqualified requirement for a restrictive covenant to run, both
as to benefit and burden, is that it be negative in character, and that the
assignee held subject to it have notice of its having been imposed upon the
land. Indeed the English courts have pushed the theory so far that in Re
Nisbit & Potts' Contract,83 they have held a disseisor, the assignee of a
squatter who transferred an adverse possession title, bound by a restrictive
covenant because he had notice of it when he acquired his possession of the
land. Even a disseisor of a trustee would not be charged with the trust after
the running of the Statute of Limitations in his favor, unless of course he
was in collusion with the trustee.84
To sum up the English law then we can say:
1. The benefit of a covenant in a deed conveying a fee interest in land,
if the covenant was intended to be annexed to the land and is not merely
personal, and is such as affects the use of the land conveyed, that is to say,
if it "touches and concerns" the land as explained in Spencer's Case and
the later decisions,8 5 will run to assignees of the covenantee both at law and
in equity. 86 The fact that the relief sought is an injunction is immaterial,
but no actual decision seems to have been rendered giving the assignee of
the covenantor compensation and damages at law for a breach of a running
covenant within the last one hundred years.
2. The burden of such a covenant does not bind the assignee of the
covenantor, either to pay compensation or to perform a positive act on the
affected land, since the decision requiring the assignee to perform the covenant in Cooke v. Chilcott87 has been repeatedly disapproved, as we have
seen, although no directly contrary decision has been rendered.
3. The burden of a restrictive covenant binds the affected land in the
hands of any subsequent claimant of the land, if he has notice of the making
of the covenant at or before acquiring his claim to the land.
Apparently for the running of the burden of a restrictive covenant so as
s2Wilson v. Hart, L. R. I Ch. 463 (1866).
83
84Re Nisbit & Potts' Contract, [1905] 1 Ch. 391.
See Lewin on Trusts, 8th Eng. Ed. 250.
855 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Repr. 72 (1583); Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Ald. 1, 106 Eng.
Repr. 1094 (1821); Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042 (1834);
Williams
v. Earle, L. R. 3 Q. B. 739 (1868).
86
This seems to have been actually held last in Rogers v. Hosegood, L. R. [1900]

2 Ch. 388.
873 Ch. Div. 694 (1877).
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to bind assignees, a mere agreement between the original parties is sufficient, without any conveyance of land.s8
In this state of the English law the enactment of some Act of Parliament
clarifying the situation would seem appropriate 8 9
II.

THE HISTORY OF REAL COVENANTS: AmERICAN CASES

Many early American cases held that both the benefits and burdens of
covenants ran with the land to assignees thereof, when the covenants were
intended to run and touched and concerned the land benefited and the land
burdened, 9 although they generally held that there must be "privity of
estate" between the original covenantor and the original covenantee to start
the covenant as a running covenant. 91
Apparently the first American case was Dunbar v. Jumper,92 decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1796. One Dunbar, Sr., sold to one
Thompson a half acre of ground, required for the grantee's operation of
his mill, Thompson covenanting that Dunbar might have ground, free at
the mill, all the corn consumed by Dunbar in his home so long as the mill
should stand. The suit was brought by Dunbar's son and heir against
8
BRenals
89

v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. Div. 125 (1878); 11 Ch. Div. 866 (1879).
Section 79(a) of the English Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 George V, c. 20,
seems to be applicable. It is as follows:
"79(a)-(l) A covenant relating to any land of a covenantor or capable of being
bound by him, shall, unless a contrary intention is expressed, be deemed to be made
by the covenantor on behalf of himself his successors in title and the persons deriving

title under him or them, and, subject as aforesaid, shall have effect as if such suc-

cessors and other persons were expressed.
"This subsection extends to a covenant to do some act relating to the land, notwithstanding that the subject-matter may not be in existence when the covenant is made.
"(2) For the purposes of this section in connexion with covenants restrictive of the
user of land 'successors in title' shall be deemed to include the owners and occupiers
for the time being of such land.
"(3) This section applies only to covenants made after the commencement of this
Act."
There seems to be some doubt, however, that the English Courts will construe the
above
Act as changing the law. See CLARK, op. cit. mepra note 3 at 146, n. 84.
9
ODunbar v. Jumper, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 74 (1796); Herbaugh v. Zentmyer, 2 Rawle
159 (Pa. 1828); Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837); Savage v. Mason,
3 Cush. 500 (Mass. 1849), probably the first American party wall agreement; Carley
v. Lewis, 24 Ind. 23 (1865) ; Maine v. Cumston, 98 Mass. 317 (1867) ; National Bank
at Dover v. Segur, 39 N. J. L. 173 (1877), which applied to benefits only howeier;
65 (1871). In the Illinois case Justice Walker
Dorsey v. St. L A. & T. Ry., 58 Ill.,
held that burdens of covenants were carried to assignees by analogy to warranties,
the exact theory of the author of this article. Justice Walker held that the Statute
of 32 Henry VIII, c. 34, was enacted to enlarge the remedy. In Wooliscroft v. Norton,
15 Wis. 217 (1862) the court referred to the note in Smith's Leading Cases, and then
held
that the burden of the covenant ran with the fee.
91
E.g. Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. 459 (1837) ; Cole v. Hughes, 54 N. Y. 444 (1873).
922 Yeates 74 (Pa. 1871).
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Thompson's assignee for a breach of the covenant, and the court held that
the burden of the covenant ran with the mill property, and that the assignee
was liable. There seems to have been no doubt in the mind of the court
that the burden of a covenant could run to assigns.
The next case, Herbaugh v. Zentnvyer,93 also in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was decided in 1828. Zentmyer conveyed a piece of land to
his son, the son agreeing in writing, for himself and his assigns, to deliver
to his father certain produce bf the land annually. The son assigned the
land and the assignee defaulted. The court held that the assignee was bound
as he would be to pay rent, which ran like a covenant.
The next case seems to have been Morse v. Aldrich,9 4 decided in Massachusetts in 1837. C conveyed to H thirteen acres of ground, including a
part of the grantor's mill-pond. H conveyed to the plaintiff. C and the plaintiff, some ten years later, made an agreement, under seal, by which C covenanted to drain the pond annually, if demanded by the plaintiff, to enable
the plaintiff to obtain mud as fertilizer from the bottom of the pond. C's
land was inherited by the defendant. The court held that the burden of
the covenant ran with the land to the heir, though not mentioned in the
covenant as bound, being of the opinion that "privity of estate" existed
between the original parties.
It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania court did not cite any English
authorities questioning the running of burdens, and while the Massachusetts
court cited the three famous English cases which started the English courts
away from allowing burdens to run, namely, Spencer's Case,95 Webb v.
Russell,96 and Keppell v. Bailey,97 the Massachusetts court regarded them
as requiring merely privity of estate between the covenantor and the covenantee. The truth is that Spencer's Case did not say anything about the
running of covenants with fees. Only the note of John William Smith,
in his collection of "Leading Cases," gives Spencer's Case that quirk. supported by Sergeant Williams' note to Thursby v. Pla-nL. 98 And Lord Kenyon
in deciding Webb v. Russell, after saying, "It is extremely well settled at
common law, without referring to the Statute 32 Hen. VIII, Ch. 34, that
covenants which run with the land will pass to the person to whom the land
descends," adds that the Statute was enacted for the benefit of grantees of
932 Rawle 159 (Pa. 1828).

o-19 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837).
955 Coke 16a. 77 Eng. Repr. 72 (1583).
963 T. R. 393, 402, 100 Eng. Repr. 639, 644 (1789).
972 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042 (1834).
981 Wins. Saunders 237, 240.
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reversions, and to give lessees rights against them. So it is only an implication, that Lord Kenyon thought the burden of covenants did not run at
common law to assigns.
Lord Broughan's well worked out opinion in Keppell v. Bailey is the
first clear statement of the English courts that the burden of a covenant
cannot bind assignees of the covenantors, and his reason for so stating was
that there is no privity of estate attendant upon the transfer of a fee from
a grantor to a grantee, as exists between a lessor and a lessee. That is to
say, there is no continuing community of interest inherent in the transfer
from one owner to another of an estate in fee.
After Morse v. Aldrich and several other early American cases99 took the
position that there is privity of estate between the grantor and the grantee
when the granted land is a part of the land retained, or when the pieces are
interrelated in some way, and that the burden of a covenant can run to
and against assigns of these affiliated pieces, either at law or in equity, it
was not easy to persuade any American court to hold otherwise merely
because the editor of Smith's Leading Cases and later English decisions took
a different course. So when Lord Cottenham's theory of equitable restrictive
agreements binding land in the hands of assignees with notice, was applied
in 1848 in Tidk v. Moxhay'0 it became, in America, merely an additional
device for holding as binding, restrictive covenants which would have been
binding in equity or at law as running covenants anyway, provided of course
they touch and concern the affected land.' 01 Certain types of restrictions
upon the .use of property have been enforced on the Tulk v. Moxhay theory
which would probably not have been held to run otherwise. But they would
seem rather personal obligations than covenants touching and concerning
the land.'0 2
As the question before the Law Institute however was whether modern
American law limits the running of burdens of covenants to restrictive covenants only, it is best to run through the list of states alphabetically, and
so far as the question has been recently before the courts for decision, to
9'9Sec footnote 90.
11"12 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Repr. 1143 (1848).
""National
Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N. J. L. 173 (1877).
102
' Cf. Mosbey v. Roche, 233 Ala. 280, 171 So. 351 (1936), a covenant not to allow
bathing parties on the land. In Norcross v. James. 140 Mass. 188. 2 N. E. 946 (1885)
Holmes, J., held that a covenant not to mine limerock on the land was a purely personal obligation. It may well be doubted whether any covenant not to maintain an
alcoholic drinking store, or many other specific businesses, touches and concerns the
land. An agreement not to engage in any mercantile business in competition with the
business of the vendor on the land he retained, was held unenforceable in Tardy v.
Creasy, 81 Va. 553 (1886).
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refer to the late cases which seem to settle the law upon the question in
the respective states.
1. Alabama. In Alabama it has been accepted as law ever since Robbins
v. Webb, decided in 1880,103 that both the benefits and burdens of covenants
can run with land either at law or in equity, and all sorts of covenants
both active and restrictive have been considered since that time, ending with
Virgin v. Garrett,0 4 and Moseby v. Roche, 1 5 both decided by the same
judges at the same term of court in 1936. Each was a suit for an injunction
to enforce a restrictive covenant. The restriction in Virgin v. Garrett could
have been enforced either in equity or at law under Robbins v. Webb. The
restriction in Moseby v. Roche probably could not have been. The fact that
the court called each an equitable easement would seem unimportant, as
the court did not say that they were unforceable by injunction only. It
would seem therefore that in Alabama a covenant can run at law or in
equity on the theory that it is a common law right, or if restrictive, it can
run in equity against assignees with notice on the equitable easement theory.
2. Arkansas. Bank of Hoxie v. Meriweathe' 0° held that the burden
of an agreement to pay part of the cost of a party wall, when used. creates
an equitable lien on the land. Rugg v. Lemment' 0 7 had already held that
the benefit of a party wall agreement runs with the land.
3. California. Many California cases may be found on the subject of
running covenants, but a statute authorizes the running of benefits only when
contained in a grant. While the burdens of certain covenants not contained
in grants seem to run, 8s it seems best to omit California law from the general classification of the American law.
4. Colorado. Farmers' High Line Canal and Reservation Co. v. New
Hampshire Real Estate Co.,:" 9 was a suit for damages against an irrigation
company for failure to furnish water as required by a covenant supporting
an easement to run water through a ditch owned by the plaintiff's assignor.
The court held that the benefit of the covenant ran with the land at law,
and the burden was attached to the defendant's easement in the ditch.
5. Connecticut. Baker v. Lunde"" held that where land was sold with
a covenant to build only residences upon it, and the intention was that all
10368 Ala. 393 (1880).
104233 Ala. 34, 170 So. 75 (1936).
105233 Ala. 280, 171 So. 351 (1936).
106166 Ark. 39, 265 S. W. 642 (1924).
10778 Ark. 65, 93 S. W. 570 (1906).
10 8 Marra v. Etna Construction Co., 15 Cal. (2d) 375, 101 P. (2d) 490 (1940).
10940 Colo. 467, 92 Pac. 290 (1907).
11096 Conn. 530, 114 At. 673 (1921).
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sub-vendees should benefit, assignees of the various subdivisions could
enforce the covenant against each other. The court called it "an equitable
right appurtenant to all the land" in the plot, but did not say that it ran
only in equity.
6. Delaware. Jackson v. Richards'1 held that a partly built bottling
plant, begun in disregard of a restriction against business use of a lot,
could be ordered demolished at the suit of the assignee of one lot against
the assignee of the other. The court said that the restriction must be in
writing, but as the case came up on demurrer to a bill in equity, the agreement was assumed to have been written. The opinion did not say that the
agreement would not have run at law, nor that damages could not have
been recovered for its breach.
7. Florida. Osius v. Barton" 2 held a bill to enforce a restrictive covenant good if the plaintiff was among the intended beneficiaries. The same
was held in Mercer v. Kenton." 3 Neither case said that the covenant would
not run at law.
14
8. Georgia. Muscogee Manufacturing Co. v. Eagle and Phoenix Mils"
recognized that covenants run with land, although the case turned on riparian
rights to water. But in Atlanta, Knoxville & Northern Railway v. McKinne 03 the court gave damages for breach of a covenant by defendant's
predecessor.
9. Illinois. Natural Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co."16 held that
the burden of a covenant not to quarry stone runs with the land. The court
said that a covenant which can run, will run, but that a covenant which
cannot run, cannot be made by agreement to do so. Gerlinger v. Lain"7
already had held that covenants run.
8
was an action for damages for failure
10. Indiana. Milliken v. Hunter"1
to carry out a purchase of land, the question being whether the burden of
a building restriction was an encumbrance, and the court held that the burden ran with the land.
9
held that the burden of a covenant to
11. Iowa. Sexauer v. Wilson"0
fence runs with the land.
11127 A. (2d) 857 (Del. 1942).
112109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
11899 Fla. 914, 127 So. 859 (1930).

114126 Ga. 710, 54 S. E. 1028 (1906).
115124 Ga. 929, 53 S. E. 701 (1906).
116309 Ill. 230, 140 N. E. 84 (1923).
117269 Ill. 337, 149 N. E. 972 (1915).
118180 Ind. 149, 100 N. E. 1041 (1913).
"19136 Iowa 357, 113 N. W. 941 (1907).
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12. Kansas. Rives v. Morris'20 held that restrictive covenants in deeds
can be enforced between assignees. The court did not say that they would
not run at law.
13. Kentucky. Chicago M. & G. Ry. v. Dodd., 2 1 was a suit for damages
on a covenant to fence between the assignors of the plaintiff and defendant
respectively, and the court held that the covenant ran with the land. Stark
v. Foley,122 a later case, enforced between assignees a restrictive covenant
as running with the land.
14. Maine. Gilman v. Forgianex23 was a suit by an assignee of a mortgagor on a covenant to release part of the land mortgaged, and the court
said that while the burden of covenants ran with the land, the covenant in
question was not intended to run.
15. Maryland. Whalen v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.' 24 was a suit by a covenantee's assignee to require the railroad to maintain a siding in conformity
with a covenant made sixty years earlier, and the court, while refusing an
injunction on account of the age of the covenant, said it would not decide
whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages until he should sue for them.
The running of the covenant was not questioned.
16. Massachusetts. Lacentra v. Valeri,125 enforced a restrictive covenant
for and against assignees of the parties. There was no limitation to equity.
The old law, as we have seen, definitely supported running at law.
17.

1 26
held that the benefit
Michigan. Mueller v. Banker's Trust Co.,'

and the burden of a covenant ran with the affected land, and gave damages
for a breach.
18. Minnesota. Pelser v. Gingold,1 27 sustained the position that the burden of a covenant runs at law, though the suit for damages was remanded
for further proceedings.
19. Missouri. Toothaker v. Pleasant,'28 was a suit to enforce by .injunction a restrictive covenant against occupancy of lots by Negroes. The plaintiff was not a successor of the grantor in the deed which imposed the restriction. The defendant was a remote assignee of the first grantee. It was held
that the covenant could run, but that the plaintiff, not having privity of
120155 Kan. 231, 124 P. (2d) 488 (1942).

121167 Ky. 624, 181 S. V. 666 (1916).
122209 Ky. 332, 272 S. W. 890 (1920).
12129 Me. 66, 149 At. 620 (1930).
124108 Md. 11, 69 At. 390 (1908).
125244 Mass. 404, 138 N. E. 388 (1923).
120262 Mich. 53. 247 N. W. 103 (1933).
127214 Minn. 281, 8 N. W. (2d) 36 (1943).
128315 Mo. 1239. 288 S. W. 38 (1926).
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estate with the first grantor, could not enforce it in equity. The court cited
Coughlin v. Barker'9 based on the English decisions, but said nothing of
running at law.
'20. Nebraska. Wright v. Pfrimner'30 held that a restrictive covenant as
to the nature of buildings which might be erected on the land ran to assigns,
benefit and burden, but that if the burdened land should be subdivided,
the owner of one part of the land restricted could not enforce it against
the owner of other parts, unless there was a general plan. Nothing was
said about running at law.
21. New Jersey. The ruling in Brewer v. Marshall,3 1 seems still to
control in New Jersey. It involved a covenant not to sell marl from the
granted land. The court held the covenant illegal, and referred to the note
to Spencer's Case. This case was strengthened by DeGray v. Manmouth
Beach Club House Co.,. 32 which adopted the Tulk v. Moxhay doctrine, adding the general plan theory. Enderle v. Leslie Construction Co.,'aa and
Speidel v. Weiner,3 4 recognize the general plan theory, but allow one assignee
to enforce the restriction against another, apparently though each derives
title from the same grantee. Thus New Jersey must be classed as following
Tzdlk v. Moxhay.
22. New Mexico. Rowe v. May, 3 5 was on a bill by a purchaser of a
lot who had no actual notice of a building restriction in an early deed imposed for the benefit of all purchasers and owners of lots in a given area.
The court held that the title stood bound "with a right reposing in other
lot owners adversely affected to enforce in equity the building restriction
imposed by these covenants which run with the land." Bolles v. Pecos
Irrigation Co.,' 6 already held that the burden of a covenant ran at law.
Therefore, in New Mexico, probably both theories of covenants are accepted.
23. New York. The present lav as to the running of covenants in New
York is determined by three cases, Miller v. Clary, decided in 1913,'3 7
Gutranty Trust Co. of New York v. Queens County Railway Co., decided
in 1930,138 and Neponsit Property O'wners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial
12946

Mo. App. 54 (1891).

13099 Neb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060 (1916).

13119 N. J. Eq. 537 (1888).
13250 N. J. Eq. 829, 24 Atl. 388 (1892).
1=1102 N. J. Eq. 569, 141 Atd. 758 (1920).
134129 N. J. Eq. 434, 19 A. (2d) 875 (1941).
13544 N. Mex. 264, 101 P. (2d) 391 (1940).
136167 P. 280 (1917). Cf. also Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F. (2d) 908 (1925).
237210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1914).
138253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930).
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Savings Bank, decided in 1938.139 The first case held that the assignee of
land benefited by a covenant to build a shaft to a wheel generating electric
power purchased along with a piece of land, could require the furnishing of
the power, but could not compel the assignee of the mill to construct the
shaft, as a positive covenant cannot run. The second case, the opinion being
written by Judge Cardozo, contained his terse statement, "there is now in
this State a settled rule of law, that a covenant to do an affirmative act, as
distinguished from a covenant merely negative in effect, does not run with
land so as to charge the burden of performance on a subsequent grantee."
The covenant not enforced was to include after-acquired property in a prior
mortgage. The last case involved a covenant in a deed that the property
should be charged with an annual payment of money to build roads and
sewers. The court (Judge Lehman) held that the burdens of the covenants
were intended to run, touched and concerned the land, and were enforceable
against assignees. Thus New York is approaching the position that benefits
and burdens of covenants can run with the land.
24. North Carolina. It was decided in Herring v. Wallace Lumber
Coinpany,'40 that the burden of a covenant to build a railroad runs with
land, or an easement over land, to assignees of the covenantor. The opinion
cited the conclusive case of Norfleet v. Cromwell.141 Four recent cases,
however, recognize a restrictive covenant as an interest in land in the nature
of an easement, enforceable in equity against an assignee, without regard
to whether the covenant is construed to run with the land142 or not. So in
North Carolina both theories of covenants seem to be accepted.
25. Ohio. Maher v. Cleveland Union Stock-yards Co., 43 a recent case
in the Ohio Court of Appeals, held that the burden of a covenant for a
money charge runs to an assignee of the land charged. The Ohio Supreme
4
Court held in Hichey v. Lake Shore & Michigan Central Ry., in 1894,1
that the burden of a covenant to fence runs to an assignee, and there seems
to have been nothing since discrediting that case. So covenants probably.
run at law or equity in Ohio.
45
26. Oklahona. In Local Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Eckroat,
139278 N. Y. 248, 15 N. E. (2d) 793 (1938).
140163 N. C. 481, 79 S. E. 876 (1913).
14170

N. C. 634 (1874).

142 Sheets v. Dillon, 221 N. C. 426, 20 S. E. (2d) 344 (1942) ; Turner v. Glenn, 220
N. C. 620, 18 S. E. (2d) 197 (1941); Brenziger v. Stephens, 220 N. C. 395, 17 S. E.
(2d) 471 (1941) ; Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 509, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
14355 Ohio App. 412, 9 N. E. (2d) 995 (1936).
14451 Ohio St. 40, 36 N. E. 672 (1894).
145186

Okla. 656, 100 P. (2d) 260 (1940).
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the court held that the assignees of the reversion might recover, on a covenant of the lessee, an extra percentage on the value of the oil taken out
under the lease. The court said nothing to distinguish the running of covenants in leases from that of covenants in fees. It held that the clause in
the lease providing for payment to the lessor of a part of the proceeds of
the oil reserved to the lessee was a covenant running with the land, and
that "the lessors' deed conveying the leased premises will pass the benefits
not yet due or the burdens of such covenant to a grantee, in the absence of
4 6
a reservation thereof." A later case, Williamson v. Needles,1
enforced
restrictive covenants in equity. It would seem that in Oklahoma, both theories of the running of covenants obtain.
27. Oregon. In Guild v. lVallis'47 the court held that a covenant by the
grantee in a deed to keep a ditch open runs against the assignee of the land,
and may be enforced by a mandatory injunction, regardless of whether the
plaintiff had a remedy at law. The court cited an earlier case, Ford v.
Oregon Electric Ry Co. 1 48 Between the two cases, the court enforced a restrictive covenant, saying that such covenants were enforceable- "though such
conditions do not, in law, constitute easements or covenants running with
the land. '' 149 Evidently in Oregon both theories of running covenants are
accepted.
28. Pen.nsylianiia. Goldberg v. Nicola,150 enforced by injunction a restrictive covenant, holding that it ran with the land. Nothing was said about
its being able to run at law. But as Bald Eagle Valley Railroad v. Nittany
Valley Raiiroad,151 decided that covenants intended to run will run with
land and are enforceable in equity by injunction when that relief is appropriate, there seems to be no reason to doubt the continuance of the early
Pennsylvania law of Dunbar v. Jumper' 2" that covenants run by the common law.
29. South Carolina. Epting v. Lexington Water Po-wer Co., 153 held that
the burden of a covenant can run with land.
30. South Dakota. Hill v. City of Huron,154 held that the burden of a
party wall covenant ran with the land.
146191 Okla. 560, 133 P. (2d) 211 (1942).
147130 Ore. 278, 279 Pac. 546 (1925).
14860 Ore. 278, 117 Pac. 809 (1911).

14 9Doester v. Alvin. 74 Ore. 544. 145 Pac. 660 (1915).
150309 Pa. 183, 178 At. 809 (1935).

151171 Pa. 284, 33 At!. 239 (1895).,
1522 Yeates 74 (Pa. 1796).
153177 S. C. 308, 181 S. E. 66 (1935).
15439 S. D. 530, 165 N. W. 534 (1917).

31.

Tennessee.
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Carnegie Realty Co. v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry.

55

held

that damages could be recovered for breach of a covenant to build and maintain a depot. The burden was held to run, though the assignee was not liable
for the breach.
32. Texas. In Panhandle & S. F. Ry. v. Wiggins, " 6 the Court of Appeals held that the benefit of a party wall covenant will run to an assignee
of the covenantee. Jones v. Monroe,1 5 7 affirmed a holding of the lower court
that the burden of a party wall covenant runs; and Hines v. Parks5 8 held
that a grantee's covenant to extend electric and water lines will run to his
assignee. Thus, benefits and burdens of covenants both run in Texas.
5
and several other recent cases fol33. Virginia. Renn v. Whitehurst,"'
low the Tulk v. Moaxhay doctrine as distinct from running covenants, although the Virginia court had said in 1886 in Tardy v. Creasy,60 that, "no
end can be effected by a covenant which cannot be effected by a grant."
The recent cases, however, require Virginia to be classed as following the
Tulk v. Moxhay theory.
34. Washington. Ellensburg Lodge v. Collins,16 ' held that the burden of
a party wall covenant runs with the land.
35. West Virginia. Tennant v. Tennajt, 162 held that the burden of a
covenant runs with the land, but the covenant in question, to give a share of
oil recovered, was held to be a personal covenant only.
36. Wisconsin. Burden v. Doucette,' 63 involved a restrictive covenant,
and the court held that restrictive covenants embraced in a general scheme
would be enforced. The court said nothing of other covenants. But Crawford v. Witherbee6 held that a covenant to pay one-eighth of the ore raised
from a mine runs with the land and binds assigns, and the court in the latter case cited Wooliscroft v. Norton'6 5 that the burden of covenants runs.
So it would seem that both theories of covenants hold in Wisconsin.
155136 Tenn. 300, 189 S. W. 371 (1916).
1.0161 S. W. (2d) 501 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
157288 S. W. 802 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1926).
158128 Tex. 289, 96 S. W. (2d) 970 (1936) affirming 68 S. W. (2d) 364 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934).
159181 Va. 360, 25 S. E. (2d) 276 (1943).
16081 Va. 553 (1886).
16168 Wash. 94, 122 Pac. 602 (1912). Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle Const.
& Dry Dock Co., 102 Wash. 608, 173 Pac. 508 (1918), held that the burden of .a
covenant could attach to land to be acquired in future. This is in accord with Lewis
v. Golner, 129 N. Y. 221, 29 N. E. 81 (1891).
16269 W. Va. 28, 70 S. E. 851 (1911).
1632 N. W. (2d) 204 (Wisc. 1942).
16477 Wis. 419, 46 N. W. 545 (1890).
16515 Wis. 198 (1862).
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37. Wyomng. Lingle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Building &
Loan. Ass'n,'0 6 rejects the law of Tudk v. Moxhay and later English decisions,
and holds that benefits and burdens of appropriate covenants run to assigns
at law or in equity.
It thui appears that, omitting California as stated above, twenty-eight States
allow the running of the benefits and burdens of covenants to assigns without distinction between law and equity; but that six of these, Alabama, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin, recognize the
equitable easement theory as an additional device for allowing the burden
of restrictive covenants to run. It appears that Connecticut. Delaware,
Florida, Kansas, and Missouri allow restrictive covenants to be enforced in
equity without ruling whether they or active covenants run at law or not.
And lastly New Jersey and Virginia alone follow the Tulk v. Moxhay theory.
III.
A.

THE

ToPrc

OF COVENANTS AS SET FORTH IN THE RESTATEMENT

The Running of the Burden

The Law Institute's Restatement does not differentiate characteristics of
covenants which run with land from requirements for their running. After
the "Introductory Note' on "Promises Respecting the Use of Lands." in
which the Reporter sets out his views on the background and history of
real covenants (which, as we have seen, is a general acceptance of the note
of Sergeant Williams to Thursby v. Plant and that of John William Smith
to Spencer's Case), he states the requirement of an intention of the parties
that a covenant should run, if it is to be allowed to do so (Section 79), and
then says that for the burden of a covenant to run. the covenant must be
in writing under seal (Section 80). Under this latter section Comment (a)
says that the Statute of Frauds requires it to be in writing as creating an
67
interest in the promisor's land.'
A search for cases holding the Statute of Frauds applicable to unwritten
agreements respecting the use of land reveals nine states which seem to
support the Reporter's position, and of course others may be found by prolonged search. These states are: Alabama.168 Kentucky,16 9 Massachusetts,170
16643 Wyo. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931).
'6 7 Comment a to Section 80 refers back to Section 70, which states the requirement

more fully as applicable first between the original parties at the creation of the covenant.
6

16"Sheuer
v. Britt, 217 Ala. 196, 115 So. 237 (1928).
9
1 Starck v. Foley, 209 Ky. 332, 272 S. W. 890 (1920).
170Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 280, 100 N. E. 622 (1913). This case held an

equitable interest not a covenant running with. the land.
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New Hampshire,"" New York, 17 2 North "Carolina,173 Rhode Island,1 4
Texas, 75 and Wisconsin ;176 but the New York cases, all in the lower courts.
are of doubtful authority in view of the holding in Le-wis v. Golner in the
highest court.' 7' The decisions in these nine states involve restrictive covenants, and are generally based on the ground that restrictive covenants
create interests in land.
On the other hand, England and fourteen states hold that restrictive covenants do not create interests in land and are not affected by the Statute of
Frauds requiring conveyances of land to be in writing. The fourteen states
are Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska. New York (based on Lescis v. Golner), Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, and \Vest Virginia. 178 Omitting New York on
both sides, the count of the states is eight holding the Statute of Frauds
applicable to covenants and thirteen holding that it is inapplicable.
Of course it makes little difference whether or not covenants not in writing are invalidated by the Statute of Frauds, because probably more than
ninety per cent of covenants intended to be attached to land are in writing.
It is only important to decide whether they are interests in land in contemplation of the Statutes of Frauds of the several states, for if they are interests in land, the courts generally call them easements, since easements are
the only kind of incorporeal hereditaments with which they can be
assimilated.
"'ITibbets
v. Tibbets, 66 N. H. 360, 20 Atl. 979 (1890).
172Wolfe v. Forst, 4 Sandf. Ch. 72, 92 (N. Y. 1846); Pitkin v. L. I. R.. Co., 2
Barb. Ch. 221 (N. Y. 1847) ; Day v. N. Y. Central Ry., 31 Barb. 548 (N. Y. 1860);
Norton v. Kain, 121 App. Div. 497, 106 N. Y. S. 129 (1907).
1734Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925).
17 Harn v. Massasoit Real Estate Co., 42 R. I. 293, 107 Atl. 205 (1919).
5
17 Miller v. Babb, Texas Commission of Appeals, § A., 263 S. W. 254- (1924).
17
6Florsheim v. Reinberger, 173 Wis. 150, 179 N. W. 793 (1921). This case held
that the oral agreement was unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds, the restriction not being imposed under a general plan; but indicated that an oral restriction,
if part of a general plan, might be enforced.
"17Lewis v. Golner, 129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E. 81 (1891). This is distinguished, however,8 by Gaynor, J., in Ritter v. Kain, 121 App. Div. 497, 106 N. Y. S. 129 (1907).
17Jamison v. Kinwell Bay Land Co., 47 The Times Law Reports 593 (Ct. of App.
1931) ; Thornton v. Schobe. 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pac. 617 (1925); Hall v. Solomon, 61
Conn. 476, 23 Atl. 876 (1892); Tsuboi v. Cohn, 40 Ida. 102, 231 Pac. 708 (1924);
State ex rel. Field v. Barket, 182 Ind. 665, 108 N. E. 113 (1914); Osgood v. Nann,
191 Ia. 1227, 184 N. W. 331 (1921) ; Dodder v. Snyder. 110 Mich. 69, 67 N. W. 1101
(1896) ; Youngman v. Ahrens, 104 Minn. 531, 116 N. W. 1135 (1908) ; Berry v. Jones,
106 Miss. 115, 63 So. 341 (1913); Meyer v. Perkins. 89 Neb. 59, 130 N. W. 986 (1911);
McCloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa. 319, 90 Atd. 73 (1914); Leinau v. Smart, 11 Hump. 308
(Tenn. 1850) ; Hitchcock v. Tbwer, 55 Vt. 60 (1883); Johnson v. Mt. Baker Church,
113 Wash. 448, 94 Pac. 536 (1920) ; Henner v. Deveney, 71 W. Va. 629, 77 S. E. 142
(1913). The Statute of Mississippi requires merely contracts for the sale of land to be
in writing. See Berry v. Jones, 106 Miss. 115, 63 So. 341 (1913).
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But the phrase, "interest in land," has a practical rather than a juristic
significance. The juristic term is "interest with regard to land," the legal
philosopher holding that all interests are merely relations between persons.
It was only when the group first engaged in restating the law of property
for the American Law Institute found that the theory of relations between
persons could not be fitted easily to the universal conception of ownership of
land that they invented the phrase "interest in land."1 79
The phrase requires interpretation again in this Restatement in connection
with the statutes requiring compensation for "interests" in land when taken
under eminent domain. In Section 113 of Final Draft 2 covering the Restatement of Covenants, the annual meeting of the Institute adopted the form
presented, representing the view of a majority of the advisers, Sub-section
(2) of which is, "A promise respecting the use of land of the promisor
creates an interest in such "land within the meaning of this section and Section 114 in so far and only in so far as the promise creates an obligation
binding upon the successors of the promisor." This entailed the adoption of
Section 114, which requires compensation to every person entitled to the
benefit of the promise, thereby making the taking for public use impracticable
when there are many persons claiming the benefit of covenants attached to
the taken land."
One Adviser, Judge J. Warren Madden, urged that the Institute take the
position that covenants (except those secured by liens) do not create "interests in land" within the contemplation of the Statutes.
Moreover an interest in land under the Statute of Frauds may not be the
same thing as an interest in land under the statutes awarding compensation
under eminent domain. The applicability of the Statute of Frauds is a matter for each state to decide for itself under its own statute, and conformity
to some usual Statute of Frauds should iaot be made a general requirement
for the running of covenants in both law and equity.
After declaring that covenants with regard to land are subject to the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds, the Reporter declares that "a promise
by the grantee in a deed-poll, which promise is contained in the deed . . .
is not subject to the provisions of the Statute of Frauds."' 18
1 79

Comment c to § 5 of the REsTATEMENT oF Paopsmry is "Interest in, land or other
thing, There are rights, -privileges, powers and immunities with regard to specific land
or with regard to a thing other than land, which exist only in a particular person. By
virtue of the fact that a person has these special interests, other than and in addition
to those possessed by members of society in general, he occupies a peculiar and individual position with regard thereto. Interests of this type constitute the chief subject
matter of this Restatement, and, when the affected thing is land, are designated herein
as 'interests
in land'."
0
28 REsTATMENT, PaoPErrY (Final Draft No. 1, 1943) § 70.
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Undoubtedly the maxim, "Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus" 18
'
was long ago applied to covenants imposed on the grantee in a deed-poll.
Littleton applied the principle to a remainderman coming in after a life
tenant who alone bad signed an indenture with the grantor conveying a life
estate to one with the remainder to another." 2 Since deeds-poll are generally used as conveyances in America, even where they purport to impose
covenants on the grantee, it must be accepted as law in America that covenants in deeds-poll run with the granted land. Sometimes. positive covenants
so created have been enforced against assignees of the grantee. 1 83 and a
much cited case based upon the maxim was Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leailjtt,8 4
which was a restrictive covenant.
The running of burdens imposed upon grantees and their successors in
deeds-poll gives difficulties, however, and the explanation given in comment (c) that the grantor's signing and sealing is indicative of deliberation
by the parties. and is therefore sufficient, is not found in the decisions. The
reason given by the courts is usually that the assignee is bound by estoppel
(as was the first grantee, of course). or that the imposed unsigned covenant
creates a sort of easement binding in equity against assignees with notice,
either actual or by the record. 8 5
The principle of estoppel would seem to be as effective to bind the assignee
of the grantee-covenantor to perform an active covenant as to require him
to observe a passive or restrictive one. Therefore, if we accept ex necessitate
as law that a covenant in a deed-poll can run with the granted land and if
we are in a state which does not accept the notion that a covenant creates
an interest in land, we seem obliged to say that any promise. written or
verbal, of which the assignee has notice, provided it touches and concerns
the affected land, and is intended to run with it. should run with land. unless.
of course, the land is conveyed by a written deed and the parole promise is
inadmissible in evidence as an addition to the contract expressed by the deed;
which is sometimes urged as a defense against such parole agreements.
That brings us to Section 82 of the Restatement of Covenants. of which
Sub-section (a) requires that for a covenant to start running there must
81

"He who derives the advantage should suffer the burden 4lso.'" See BRoo?,r, LEGAL

MAXIMS
552.
2

18 LIrrLTLoEN, TENURFs § 374, Co. LIr. 231. Coke quoted the maxim, and added
"transit
terra cuin onere."
'4 3 Ga. So. Ry. v. Reeves, 64 Ga. 492 (1880); Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 465
(1869).
18450 Barb. 135 (N. Y. 1867).
' 8 3McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288 (1885); Hill v. Weil. 202 Ala. 400. 80 So.
536 (1918).
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be a transfer of land or of some recognized easement between the original
promisor and the original prlomisee.
That is a technical requirement, based on the origin of covenants in common iaw warranties, 8 6 but there has been much argument against it. Judge
Charles E. Clark argues that it was never required in the old law, and that
it is not necessary today. 18 7 Numerous cases involving party wall agreements
seem not to have involved grants of land between the original parties, unless
an easement in land is implied from the permission to build the party wall. 8 8
As a good many early American cases required a grant between the
creating parties in order for a covenant to run,189 an effort has been made
to find the holdings in the last cases in all the states which have recently
considered the question. The list is given in a footnote, in which the states
which hold that a grant is necessary, or which assume that a grant is necessary, have been classed as supporting the position; whereas, those which
hold that no grant is necessary, or which do not mention a grant in the
opinion, are classed as against it. Seventeen siates still seem to require a
grant. and seven states seem not to do so. 90
86
See Sims, op. cit. supra note 5 at c. 3.
187(1942) 52 YALE L. J. 199. For the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes see

HOLMEs,

THnE
COMMON LAW (1881) 381-409.
188 E.g. Leek v. Meeks, 199 Ala. 89, 74 So. 31 (1917).
9
18 Morse v. Aldrich, 19 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1837); Savage v. Mason, 3 Cush. 500
(Mass. 1849); Lyon v. Parker, 45 Me. 474 (1858); Cole v. Hughes, 54 N. Y. 444
(1873); Fitch v. Johnson, 104 Ill. 111 (1882).
19 0 States requiring a grant between promisor and promisee to enable a covenant to
run, whether benefits or burdens:
Alabama. Cummins v. Alexander, 233 Ala. 10, 169 So. 310 (1936).
It was the
evident view of the court that a covenant must originate in a grant. Moseby v. Roche,
233 Ala. 280, 171 So. 351 (1936), was a holding that a bill to enforce an agreement
not in a deed was good on demurrer. The court found an easement; but it was a
restrictive covenant.
Colorado. Farmers High Line Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467,
92 Pac. 290 (1907). The court found a grant of an easement and evidently thought it
necessary.
Georgia. A. K. & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 53 S. E. 701 (1906). The court
found an easement and evidently assumed the necessity of a grant of something.
Iowa. Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N. \V. 941 (1937). The court speaks
of privity of estate and evidently thought there must be a grant between the covenanting
parties.
Indiana. Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 492 (1881), held a grant was required.

Stover v. Harlan, 87 Ind. App. 347, 154 N. E. 882 (1927), enforced a covenant in
a deed but did not say that the deed was necessary.
Kentucky. Swiss Oil Corp. v.-Dickey. 232 Ky. 298, 22 S. W. (2d) 912 (1929), held
that a grant was necessary between the originating parties.
Maine. Smith v. Kelly, 56 Me. 64 (1870). The language of the court reveals that
it thought a grant necessary.
.lfaryland. Levy v. Dundalk. 11 A. (2d) 476 (1940), held a grant necessary.
Mrevada. Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871), held a grant necessary.
.Vew Mexico. Bolles v. Pecos Irrigation Co., 23 N. M. 32, 167 Pac. 280 (1917).
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Thus, while a majority of the states which have recently acted upon the
question seem to support Sub-section (a) of Section 82, this majority is only
about one-third of the American states and territories. Sub-section (b), which
seems to qualify Sub-section (a), is so difficult to construe that it might
well have been omitted to save confusion of the question. The comments
seem to reveal the intent of the Reporter to state merely that the existence
of an easement against a piece of land prior to the creation of the covenant
is sufficient to enable the newly created covenant to run, though there was
no grant made at the date of the covenant. If, however, the transactions
are distinct or the separate covenant is an afterthought, even though the
parties are successors to the purchaser and promisee, to hold that the coveThe court found an easement granted and followed Sexauer v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357,
113 N. W. 941 (1907). Thus, it evidently thought an easement necessary.
New York. Neponsit Property Owners Assn. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,
278 N. Y. 248, 15 N. E. (2d) 793 (1938). The court said a grant was necessary between promisor and promisee. Meadow Lawn Homes v. Westchester Lighting Co., 13
N. Y. S. (2d) 709 (1938), similar holding.
North Carolina. Herring v. Wallace Lumber Co., 163 N. C. 481, 79 S. E. 876 (1913),
grant held necessary. Barringer v. Va. Trust Co., 132 N. C. 409, 43 S. E. 910 (1902),
held a grant necessary.
South Carolina. Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S. C. 308, 181 S. E.
66 (1935), clearly considered a grant necessary.
Texas. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. (2d) 501 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942), grant required. Talley v. Howsley, 170 S. W. (2d) 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942),
grant required. But see Jones v. Monroe, 288 S. W. 802 (1926) affirming opinion in
285 S. W. 1015 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1924) which had sustained the running of a party
wall agreement apparently without a grant.
West Virginia. Horbert v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 207, 84 S. E. 770 (1914).
The court evidently thought a grant required.
Wisconsin. Crawford v. Witherbee, 77 Wis. 419, 46 N. W. 545 (1890). The court
evidently thought a grant required.
Wyoming. Lingle Water Users Co. v. Occidental B. & L. Assn., 43 Wyo. 41, 297
Pac. 385 (1930), grant required.
States not requiring a grant between promisor and promisee to enable covenants to
rUn:
California. (Apart from Civil Code) Martin v. Holm, 197 Cal. 733, 746, 242 Pac. 718
(1925), a restrictive covenant. Held no grant required. See also Marra v. Aetna Co.,
15 Cal. (2d) 375, 101 Pac. (2d) 490 (1940).
Kansas. Southworth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755, 82 Pac. 785 (1905), rehearing of 81 Pac.
481 (1905). The original opinion enforced an agreement not originating in a grant.
M*chigan. Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegan, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N. W.
103 (1932). Agreement enforced, evidently not originating in a grant.
Minnesota. Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 14 N. W. 874 (1883). No
grant required. Later cases are not clear, but evidently do not change the law. Pelser
v. Gingold, 214 Minn. 281, 8 N. W. (2d) 36 (1943).
Montana. Heringstadt v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 Pac. 1212 (1935),
grant evidently not required. '
Nebraska. Loyal Mystic Legion v. Jones. 73 Neb. 342, 102 N. W. 621 (1905), held
a contract for a party wall ran, evidently not requiring a grant.
Pennsyhtnia. Bald Eagle Valley R.R. v. .Nittany .Valley R.R., 171 Pa. 284, 33 Att.
239 (1895), grant not required.
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nant runs does not differ much from holding that a covenant can run if
it touches and concerns the affected land when no grant is made between
the parties.
Except for the history of real covenants, especially prior to the Statute
of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, which gave rise to a distinction between the law of
covenants in leases and that of covenants attached to fees (and there could
hardly have been any difference theretofore), the only practical reason for
requiring a grant between a covenantor and a covenantee for the covenant
to run to their assigns, is to discourage the creation of ill-considered covenants. But if we consider the effective control over them obtained by the
limitation set by the Queen's Bench in Spencer's Case in 1583, and elaborated since, namely, that in order to run they must "touch and concern"
the land, there is little value in an additional requirement that a corporeal
or incorporeal interest in land must pass between the parties. Of course
there must be a privity of estate between the covenantor and his successor,
else the covenant must needs be an easement, and we have seen that a restrictive covenant is in no sense an easement. It would likewise seem that there
must be a privity of estate between the covenantee and his successor claiming
the benefit of the covenant. Otherwise he would be a stranger to the covenant, whose rights, if any, would depend upon a named beneficiary's right
to enforce a contract, a conception of very modern law.
Certainly, then, there is no reason why states which have already decided
that a grant between the promisor and the promisee is unnecessary should
change their position to conform to Section 82 of the Restatement. Jurisdictions which have not passed upon the point, as yet; apparently twentyfour states, and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico,
might well disregard the requirement by judicial action, or adopt a statute
similar to the English Statute of 1925,191 but drawn in such a way as not to
be misconstrued.
Section 85 of the Restatement has caused much discussion. Its chief purpose seems to have been to express in concrete terms the requirement for
real covenants that they "touch and concern" the affected land. The effort
to avoid technical terms would seem commendable, but the result is unhappy. It is as follows:
Relation of Benefit and Burden.
The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner
has made a promise can be bound as promisors only if
(a) the performance of the promise will benefit the promisee or other
191See note 89 supra.
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beneficiary of the promise in the physical use or enjoyment of
the land possessed by him, or
(b) the consummation of the transaction of which the promise is a
part will operate to benefit and is for the benefit of the promisor
in the physical use or enjoyment of land possessed by'him,
and the burden on the land of the promisor bears a reasonable relation
to the benefit received by the person benefited.
Moreover, Sub-section (a) attempts to combine the law of covenants with
the right of a third party beneficiary of a contract to claim the benefit intended for him. This makes unnecessary confusion, since the problem before
us was merely to restate the law of real covenants. Anyone who claims rights
as the beneficiary of a contract can look to the Restatement of Contracts
to find what those rights are. So far as the right of an assignee of land
benefited by a covenant to sue the covenantor or the assignee of the covenantor is concerned, it would seem better to say that the covenant must
touch and concern the land, explaining in the comments the meaning of
that phrase. Too much literature may be found upon the subject to abandon
the use of "touch and concern." In addition to the old authorities cited
above, 192 Professor Harry A. Bigelow has contributed an exhaustive dis193
cussion of the subject, which leaves little to be added.
Of course, judges will differ as to whether a given covenant touches and
concerns the land to which it is supposed to be annexed. Lord Brougham
thought that a covenant to ship over a particular railroad the product of
a particular mine, did not touch and concern the mine. 94 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania evidently thought, in a similar case, that it did.195
It is impossible to avoid such divergence of opinions by resorting to concrete
definitions. 196
Sub-section (b) of Section 85 seems to be based on the notion that the
land may be burdened by a covenant which may run to the covenantor's
assigns, and at the same time benefit the covenantor's land alone. The Reporter evidently had in mind the irrigation contracts in the arid regions of
192 See note 85 mizpra.
192(1914) 12 MIcH. L. REv. 651.
.19943Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042 (1834).
1 Bald Eagle R.R. v. Nittany R.R., 171 Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 239 (1895).
195 Mr. Justice Holmes, in Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946 (1885),
held that a covenant not to quarry stone did not touch and concern the land affected
by the covenant. In Natural Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 309 Ill. 230, 140
N. E. 84 (1923) the Illinois Supreme Court held that a like covenant did touch and
concern the land.
195119051 1 Ch. 391.
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the West. But if the original irrigation company is seeking to enforce the
covenant, and there has been no assignment of the covenantee's property,
the assignee of the burdened land is of course liable for water distributed
after the assignment, and the fact that the burdened land is also benefited
is immaterial. If, on the other hand, the irrigation company has assigned
its plant, it has assigned the benefit of the covenantor's obligation.
It thus would seem that if one piece of land is burdened, another piece
is benefited, whether the benefited land is assigned or not.
The last clause of the Section seems to be merely a statement of the ordinary result of unsuccessful litigation. Neither large damages nor an injunction will be granted beyond the plaintiff's just deserts. Though a truism, it is
misleading as stated.
In Section -87 of the Restatement, the Reporter and his advisers have
followed the Tulk v. Moxhay doctrine with evident delight. In Comment i
they have also applied to American law the English decision of Re Nisbitt &
Potts' Contract,19 7 which held that a squatter'! assignee, who had notice of
a restrictive covenant, was bound by it in equity, even though a title to the
land had been acquired under the English Statute of Limitations. This is
equivalent to saying that while one can hold land adversely in America
until he acquires title, he cannot hold it adversely to a restrictive covenant
which has been imposed upon it.198 No American case has taken such a
position.
B.

The Running of the Benefit

The Restatement treats the running of the benefits of covenants quite
differently from the running of burdens. After restricting the running of
burdens, as has been noted above, the introduction to the running of benefits
says: "The benefit may, however, under modern law, by virtue of its recognition of the third party beneficiary doctrine, accrue in the first instance
not -merely to the promisee, but to others who are beneficiaries of the
promise. .

. It has . . . come to be the prevailing view that beneficiaries

of a promise other than the promisee can enforce the promise (See Restatement of Contracts, Chapter 6) even though the promise is not part of a
general plan."'199 This makes the running to others than the promisee a
matter of manifested intention, and Section 92, which prescribes that "the
benefit of a promise respecting the use of land of the beneficiary of the
197 The Reporter implies that the adverse possessor of the 'restricted land can hold
adversely against the beneficiary of the covenant. See § 87, Comment i, presumably
by198
giving the beneficiary some form of express notice.
RESTATEMENT, PPOPERTY (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1943) 281.
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promise runs with the land only so far as it was intended by the parties
to the promise that it should run," would seem tautological. Nevertheless
Section 91 stipulates "(1) The benefit of a promise can run with land ofily
if it is a promise respecting the use of land of the beneficiary of the promise," and in Sub-section (2), attempts to generalize the cases which are
included under (1).
Section 94, Comment b, then says that a seal is not necessary for the
benefit of a covenant to run to assigns, although Comment a says that
the Statute of Frauds must be complied with.
Lastly, Section 95 states that the benefit of a covenant can run with the
land only to one who succeeds to some interest of the first beneficiary in
the land respecting the use of which the covenant was made. Section 96
states that no grant is necessary between the covenantor and covenantee to
enable the benefit of a covenant to run.
C. Summary of the Restatement Position
To summarize, then, the declarations of the Restatement with regard to
the running of benefits, there is no requirement for the benefit of a covenant
to run to assigns of the covenantee but the intention of the parties that it
should do so. Although, if the intention is not otherwise clearly manifested,
the facts, that the covenant touches and concerns the land of the original
his lawful sucbeneficiary, and that the assignee seeking to enforce it is.
cessor in title; would tend greatly to prove that the parties had such an
intention. If, however, the existence of these circumstances as facts are
requirements for the benefits of covenants to run, regardless of the original
parties' intentions, then the Institute's requirements for the running of benefits of real covenants are not in conflict with the general American law,
excepting those jurisdictions which require a grant between the parties
when the covenant is created.
To summarize the requirements of the Restatement for the running of
burdens on the other hand, the Restatement requires: (1) that the covenant
be in writing in a deed executed under at least one party's seal, on the
theory that the burden of the covenant creates an interest in land under
the applicable Statute of Frauds; (2) that the covenant be incorporated in
a grant of a corporeal or incorporeal interest in land between the covenantor
and the covenantee; (3) that the covenant must touch and concern the land,
granted; and (4) that the covenant must be restrictive in nature only.
We have seen that only the third of these requirements is accepted without
dispute by the American courts; that the second is of small practical value
and has been extensively disregarded; that the first is based on a construc-
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tion of the applicable statutes rather than legal history or philosophy, and,
except as an interpretation of the statutes, cannot be sustained; and that
the fourth is illogical as well as unsound legally, and is definitely law in
only two of the states.
Compared with the Restatement's survey of the characteristics of real
covenants, or the requirements with which they are supposed to comply if
they are to run, benefit and burden respectively, with the affected lands, a
large majority of the American decisions cited in Part II of this article
seem to show that both benefits and burdens can run to respective assignees
of the covenanting parties subject only to the requirements: (1) that the
covenants were intended by the covenanting parties to run to such assignees;
and (2) that the covenants "touch and concern," in reciprocal respects, both
the benefited and the burdened lands, or to put it in the terms of the Restatement, concern "the physical use or enjoyment" by the assignees respectively
of the affected lands. If there was a grant between the original parties, as
there usually is, and the grant is an incorporeal hereditament, the incorporeal hereditament, by American law, may be one of the affected interests.
But the law of too many states allows the running of agreements or covenants
to assignees when there were actually no grants between the parties, to
allow us to state as a requirement that there must be such a grant for the
agreement to run. Certainly we should not say that a grant is required in
a particular state which has not so ruled already.
A third characteristic or limitation is that only lawful successors in title
of the covenanting parties can claim the benefits and must sustain the burdens of the covenants. This is declared as to burdens, by Section 83 of the
Restatement, but it is later abandoned as to restrictive covenants in Section
87, Comment i by the declaration that adverse possessors, even after their
adverse possessions have ripened into titles, are bound to observe the
restrictions of which they had notice when first claiming the lands.
This article does not attempt to discuss the running of a burden when the
benefit is retained by the first covenantee, nor the running of a benefit when
the burden remains on the first covenantor, as those questions seem, to the
writer, to depend so often upon principles of contract or estoppel that they
should not be discussed here.
IV.

THE USEFULNESS OF COVENANTS RATHER THAN OTHER
DEVICES FOR INTER-PARTY PROTECTION

Let us now consider, finally, the usefulness of real covenants, to see
whether they should be encouraged or discouraged in the future development
of the law.
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The covenants usually encountered in the early cases were covenants to
pay rent and to repair (chiefly in leases), covenants to fence, to maintain
dams and water levels, to clean ditches, to leave open air spaces and ways,
to pay half the expense of party walls when used, and other more or less
similar stipulations incident to the use of rural or provincial properties.
Then came covenants by railroads to maintain conveniences in return for
the grant of easements. Next came covenants restricting the uses of property,
usually in connection with plans for developing residence and occupational
zones in expanding cities and settlements. Lastly came covenants to pay
for irrigation and other semi-public services, covenants to develop and pay
royalties for mineral interests, and covenants to share in the expense of
setting up and developing projects supposed to be beneficial to separately
owned neighboring areas.
Covenants have always seemed the simplest device to obtain these desired
benefits and to assure the performance by succeeding owners of continuing
burdens necessary to the success of the particular projects. There is no
reason why courts should repudiate such undertakings. If the communities
in which they were instituted have so changed as to make their purpose no
longer maintainable or beneficial, the reduction of damages for their breach
to nominal amounts, and the power of courts of equity to withhold injunctions, make their ultimate harm to the communities negligible. The danger
expressed by Lord Brougham in Keppell v. Bailey, 199 that such covenants
if approved could "impress upon lands a peculiar character which should
follow them into all hands, however remote," has never been realized.
There are many individual business agreements which, put in the form
of covenants, and declared to be binding upon successors and assigns. would
be carried out more fully and more honestly if the running of covenants is
recognized than if dependent solely upon the law of contracts, even aided by
the third party beneficiary extension on the benefit side and by the doctrine
of estoppel on the burden side. The theory of equitable restrictive easements, if recognized, leaves unenforceable all active obligations, and so meets
only one-half of the problem.
Let us consider a few cases.
In Bald Eagle Valley R. Co. v. Nittany Valley R. Co.,2 ° trustees, holding
iron ore lands and an incomplete ore furnace, made an agreement with the
Lemont Railroad Company, the Bald Eagle Railroad Co., and the Penn1992 Myl. & K. 517, 536, 39 Eng. Repr. 1042, 1048 (1834). Cf. the discussion by the
Florida Supreme Court in refusing to enjoin the breach of an outmoded covenant in
Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
20171 Pa. 284, 33 Atd. 239 (1895).
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sylvania Railroad Company, of which the first two were subsidiaries, under
which agreement a bond issue secured by mortgage was floated by the
trustees to complete the furnace and build the Nittany Valley Railroad to
carry the products of the furnace to the tracks of the other railroads, the
Lemont Railroad Company taking part of the bond issue. A covenant in
writing was made in which the trustees and the Nittany Valley Railroad
"agreed for themselves, their successors, lessees, and assigns, in the nature
of a covenant to run with the title of the lands held by them, to give all
the traffic" from the furnace and the lands to the other three railroads so
long as they should observe the agreement on their part to take the traffic
and carry it at rates charged like traffic, which the three railroads covenanted
to do. The trustees and the Nittany Valley Company further covenanted
that they would not seek the construction of another competing railroad to
the properties. The furnace and the Nittany Valley Railroad were constructed on the property, and the other three railroads extended their lines
of service. The agreement was observed until default was made on the
bonds, when the mortgage was foreclosed and the property was bought in
by the bondholders, and a new corporation was organized to operate it.
The agreement was still observed for a time until another railroad was built
to the property with the connivance of the owners, who threatened to give
their traffic to the new railroad. The three railroads filed a bill in equity
to enforce the covenant, and the lower court held the agreement not binding
on the successor corporation, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the agreement must be performed, and the defendants were enjoined
from giving their traffic to the new railroad.
In 165 Broad-way Building v. City Investing Co.,20' the owner of an uncompleted building in New York City entered into an agreement with a
company operating the Sixth Avenue Elevated Railway to make openings
in the building and build connections and platforms to enable its occupants
and others, desiring to become passengers on the elevated railway, to go
directly on to the railway platform. The owner of the building made large
payments to the railroad company to cover the costs of construction to be
done by the railroad company, and a further large sum to maintain a ticket
seller at the entrance, all of which sums, upon discontinuance of the structure and entrance. were to be repaid "to the owner its successors or assigns."
The agreement, which was in writing, involved no grant, except easements
of passage provided for. but it was "agreed by and between the parties
hereto that this agreement shall apply to and bind their respective assigns
01120 F. (2d) 813 (1941).
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and successors in interest, and all subsequent owners and persons interested in the land affected thereby."
The building passed into the plaintiff's ownership, and the railroad was
later taken under condemnation by the City of New York, which recognized,
without litigation, the duty to refund the payments above referred to. The
City Investing Company, which had acquired the rights, if any, of the original
owner of the building, claimed that the benefit of the refunds did not run
with the land. The lower court so ruled, but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. before whom the appeal came, held that
the covenant did run with the land to the assignee of the covenantee, who
was entitled to the benefits of the obligation.
In Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinchman, ° 2 a corporation
owned certain copper mining property and agreed to sell it to one E for a
million dollars, $10,000 of which was paid in cash, $90,000 to be paid on
delivery of the deed, and the balance $900,000, to be paid out of the profits
of the mines. E assigned the agreement to B corporation. which received the
deed, paid the $90,000, and executed a separate agreement with A corporation by which it covenanted to pay 25% of the net profits of the mine in
quarterly payments until the $900,000 should have been paid. The agreement stated that it should be binding upon and enure to the benefit of successors and assigns of the parties. The rights of A corporation to the payments passed by mesne conveyances to Hinchman, the plaintiff below. The
mines, by mesne conveyances, passed to Consolidated Arizona Smelting
Company, the defendant below, which claimed that the covenant was not
binding upon it.
The lower court held that the benefit of the covenant passed to the plaintiff
and touched and concerned the land, and that the burden ran with the land
to the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed the decision and dismissed the plaintiff's suit for an accounting, a
majority of the Court being of the opinion that the agreement did not touch
and concern the land, and that it was, anyway, only a business venture.
Whether the conveyance of the mine and the covenant to pay a royalty
were one transaction, as the lower court thought, it would seem that the
covenant clearly touched and concerned the property, and as it was intended
to run, it should have been allowed to do so.
Now to consider a supposititious case. A company is a corporation engged in boring gas wells, collecting the gas, and distributing it by pipe
lines at wholesale prices over a large area. B company is a local corporation
202212 Fed. 813 (1914) revcrsibg 198 Fed. 907 (1912).
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engaged in manufacturing and distributing gas to a large city and its inhabitants for illuminating and other commercial and domestic uses. B company, finding that it can accomplish a material saving in expense by ceasing
to operate its manufacturing plant and purchasing natural gas from A company for distribution to its customers, entered into a written agreement
and covenant with A company by which A company agrees to furnish to B
company gas at a specified price at connection points agreed upon, each
company making the necessary outlays to lay pipe to the delivery and
reception points. The agreement is to last for fifty years, and recites that
it is binding upon the parties, their successors and assigns. Considerable
expense was incurred by each company and the arrangement was put into
effect. At the end of five years B company sells its entire plant and distribution system to C company. Notice of the contradiction between A company and B company is admitted. Is C company bound by the covenant to
continue the arrangement with A company?
None of the above four cases can be as justly decided on any other theory
than the theory that the benefits and burdens of covenants both run to
assignees of the parties when the agreements are clearly intended to run,
and when they touch and concern the affected land, The covenants were all
active covenants, so the doctrine of equitable restrictive covenants is inapplicable. It may be that the 165 Broaduay Building case could have been
decided the same way on the third party beneficiary theory, but the identification of the third party beneficiary would be made only by the provision
that the covenants should run to the assignee of the building benefited. The
City of New York did not deny the running of the burden. The case is a
typical one for judicial recognition of the running of covenants.
Why .should the courts reject, in any appropriate case, such a simple
principle of law? It is just, is historically founded, and is easily kept within
safe limitations by the requirement of manifested intention and the requirement that the covenant must touch and concern the affected land. No principle of law can be more easily applied by the parties who desire to avail
themselves of it, nor by the courts, either at law or in equity, when called
upon to enforce it.
In the text of Mr. Sims' article at page 5 he quotes the explanation offered by
Mr. Justice Holmes for the ability of the grantee of a covenantee to sue upon the covenant. For the exposition of another explanation, see Rabinowitz, The Origin of the
Common-Law Warranty of Real Property and the Inchoate Right of Dower, infra this
issue at page 32 et seq.-ED.

